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Background: Influenza A viruses that cause highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) also infect humans. In many
developing countries such as Ghana, poultry and humans live in close proximity in both the general and military
populations, increasing risk for the spread of HPAI from birds to humans. Respiratory infections such as influenza
are especially prone to rapid spread among military populations living in close quarters such as barracks making
this a key population for targeted avian influenza surveillance and public health education.
Method: Twelve military barracks situated in the coastal, tropical rain forest and northern savannah belts of the
country were visited and the troops and their families educated on pandemic avian influenza. Attendants at each
site was obtained from the attendance sheet provided for registration. The seminars focused on zoonotic diseases,
influenza surveillance, pathogenesis of avian influenza, prevention of emerging infections and biosecurity. To help
direct public health policies, a questionnaire was used to collect information on animal populations and handling
practices from 102 households in the military barracks. Cloacal and tracheal samples were taken from 680 domestic
and domesticated wild birds and analysed for influenza A using molecular methods for virus detection.
Results: Of the 1028 participants that took part in the seminars, 668 (65%) showed good knowledge of pandemic
avian influenza and the risks associated with its infection. Even though no evidence of the presence of avian
influenza (AI) infection was found in the 680 domestic and wild birds sampled, biosecurity in the households
surveyed was very poor.
Conclusion: Active surveillance revealed that there was no AI circulation in the military barracks in April 2011.
Though participants demonstrated good knowledge of pandemic avian influenza, biosecurity practices were
minimal. Sustained educational programs are needed to further strengthen avian influenza surveillance and
prevention in military barracks.
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Since the first human outbreak of the highly pandemic
avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 subtype in Hong Kong in
1997 [1,2], surveillance efforts to detect the H5N1-
subtype virus in birds have increased. A risk factor of
contracting the virus is by handling infected poultry and
poultry products [3]. Between December 2003 and April* Correspondence: wampofo@noguchi.mimcom.org
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reproduction in any medium, provided the or2007, an unprecedented epizootic of HPAI virus affected
poultry and wild birds in over 50 countries on 3 conti-
nents [4]. In Africa, the H5N1 virus first appeared in
Nigeria, followed by Egypt in 2006, and then spread
rapidly to poultry farms in other African countries
[5,6]. There has been limited spread of H5N1 from human
to human, but military populations are especially suscep-
tible to rapid spread of respiratory pathogens such as
influenza [7]. In many developing countries, military
personnel live in barracks in close proximity to poultry
populations. These militaries have risk factors for bothl Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Figure 1 Regional map of Ghana showing the distribution of
military barracks visited. The locations are 1; 5BN, 2; 49 Engineer
Regiment, 3; 1BN, 4; Shai Hills, 5; Asutuare, 6; 2BN, 7; 4BN, 8; 66
Artillery, 9; 3MRS, 10; Airforce, 11; Airborne, 12; Bawku.
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favorable for rapid human to human spread, making
them important groups for avian influenza surveillance
and prevention efforts. The possibility of emergence of
pandemic avian influenza in the military population
that may be called upon to play a significant role in the
pandemic response, presents a major public health
challenge and biosecurity threat. The establishment of
H5N1 in domestic poultry, unregulated trade of poten-
tially infected poultry, and high-risk farming practices
continue to put some African countries at high risk [8].
This increasing risk to the African region has high-
lighted the importance of African pandemic prepared-
ness plans and their potential shortcomings [9].
As a result, interviews on knowledge and attitudes of
poultry workers and educational interventions for health
workers have been conducted. Studies in Europe and
Asia have shown that risk perception in relation to avian
influenza was high [10,11]. In a similar study in Oyo
state, Nigeria, farm workers were knowledgeable about
AI and its associated risks, poor poultry handling prac-
tices were observed [12].
In 2005, a pandemic preparedness plan for Ghana was
drafted and approved to clearly define the actions and
resources necessary to build the capacity in the country
to adequately prepare for and respond to the threat of
pandemic avian influenza by strengthening existing
structures and their capabilities [13]. A year later the
first avian influenza outbreak in Ghana occurred on
April 14, 2007 at Kakasunanka near Tema, where 12,811
birds died and 23,327 were culled. The second outbreak
occurred in Sunyani on May 11, 2007 with 210 deaths
and 2,671 birds culled. Then on June 13, 2007, another
outbreak occurred in Aflao where 350 birds died and
1,357 were culled [14,15]. All the outbreaks were close
to military barracks. No human case was recorded in
any of the 3 outbreaks.
Following the outbreaks in Ghana, there have been two
simulation exercises with all stakeholders including the
Ghana Police Service, Customs Excise and Preventive
Services, Ghana Prisons Services, National Disaster Man-
agement Organization (NADMO), and the Ministry of
Health (MOH), but not the Ghana Armed Forces (GAF).
The recent pandemic of novel influenza A/H1N1 2009
virus clearly illustrates the unpredictable nature of
pathogens that require dynamic and evolving public
health strategies for surveillance, disease management
and mitigation. Militaries are called upon for pandemic
response and leaders require the knowledge, skills, and
experience to address the evolving nature of threats to
public health. Educating military professionals to under-
stand, monitor, respond to, control and prevent emer-
ging infections is essential for the GAF. The GAF has
the mission of providing security and protection to thecitizens, and stability during times of crisis, such as pan-
demics. The presence of individual and commercial
poultry farms in military barracks and the deployment of
Ghanaian troops for international peacekeeping opera-
tions put troops and families at increased risk. A recent
bird census in all garrisons of the GAF found 7,424 birds
being kept in or near the garrisons, with fowl constitut-
ing 5,990 (81%) of all birds; followed by ducks and tur-
keys at 8% and 6%, respectively. To date, there are
limited data on the knowledge, attitudes and practices of
troops handling or living near these birds which may in-
fluence the potential for avian influenza transmission to
humans. A public health campaign on avian influenza
was implemented which included education of GAF
troops who may own or handle poultry. Veterinarians
also carried out AI surveillance by sampling domesti-
cated birds in the military barracks.Methods
Operational area
The exercise took place in 12 Ghana Armed Forces bar-
racks in the country from 7 to 28 April 2011. These bar-
racks are located in the coastal, tropical rain forest and
northern savannah belts (Figure 1).
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Seminars on pandemic avian influenza were conducted
to sensitize all ranks of GAF personnel from the Army,
Navy and Air Force, civilian employees of the Ministry
of Defense, spouses and dependants of the uniformed
personnel and civilians living within or near the catch-
ment areas of the military barracks. The educational
seminars were held in all garrisons. Attendance sheets
were provided at the entrance of seminar rooms for the
attendees to register their names, units, ranks and signa-
tures. Within the Western region, the Army, Navy and
Air Force were brought together at the second battalion
(2BN) facilities for the seminar, while in the far north,
troops from detachments in Bazua and Bawku came
together for the seminar in Bawku. In the Northern region,
separate seminars were held for the Air Force and the
Airborne Force at the Barwah Barracks.
Education was done in four parts; showing a dramatization
of a hypothetical pandemic, conducting didactic lec-
tures, showing an AI biosecurity educational program,
and question and answer sessions. The dramatization
“Fatal Contact,” was developed in the US and depicts
an avian influenza pandemic starting in China and
spreading to the US and Africa, leading to many deaths.
The didactic lectures were conducted by military and
civilian veterinarians, public health officials and scien-
tists on the different types of avian influenza viruses,
factors contributing to emerging and re-emerging zoo-
notic diseases, signs and symptoms of bird influenza,
surveillance techniques, outbreaks and outbreak zoning.
An AI biosecurity video, developed by the Canadian
Poultry Feed Agency, was screened. The final part was an
interactive section where the troops were allowed to ask
questions and were answered by the resource persons.
Sampling
Poultry production in Ghana can be classified into three
categories by installed capacity (bird population), mar-
keting system and level of integration of its operations.
These categories include commercial farms, semi-
commercial farms and backyard/village poultry produ-
cers. On animal health services delivery, the GAF has
one veterinary clinic that provides regulatory, field and
clinical services in the capital city Accra.
A cross sectional study using an active avian influenza
surveillance approach was conducted within 12 military
barracks. A convenience sampling method based on the
availability and consent of a household member was ap-
plied. Where a member or owner of the household was
available and consented to the study, a maximum of
30-60 minutes was allotted for animal sampling and the
individual interviewed. Households were then classified
according to the installed capacity. Using criteria for
eligibility based on birds whether apparently healthy orwith respiratory signs or gastroenteritis or nervous ill-
ness, subjects were conveniently selected for either tra-
cheal or cloacal swabbing. Verbal consent was obtained
from all poultry owners to take swabs from their birds.
Backyard poultry owners and household members were
interviewed. A semi-structured questionnaire was
administered and information on demographics, basic
hygiene practices, quantity of poultry owned, poultry
death reporting, practices when deaths occurred, know-
ledge of the cause of death, and knowledge of avian
influenza was collected.
A total number of 680 birds from 102 households
were sampled. At Teshie and Burma Camp both tracheal
and cloacal samples were taken from each bird, while at
the other sites cloacal samples were taken from ducks
and tracheal samples from any other birds. All samples
collected were appropriately labelled and stored in dry
shippers containing liquid nitrogen and transported to
the National Influenza Centre (NIC) at the Noguchi
Memorial Institute for Medical Research (NMIMR) for
processing. At the laboratory, all samples were trans-
ferred to -70°C for storage until ready for processing.
Sample processing
Processing of samples took place in the Biosafety level-3
laboratory. Samples from 14 fowls found with pox-like
lesions and respiratory abnormalities were separated and
processed. The remaining samples were pooled accord-
ing to swab site (tracheal or cloacal), bird type and
household. The pools ranged from a single sample to 11.
In all 94 pools obtained, there were 58 tracheal, 35 cloacal
and 1 feather thallus (domesticated wild bird) samples.
RNA extraction
Viral RNA was extracted from 140 μl of pooled or indi-
vidual avian tracheal or cloacal swabs using the QIAmp
viral RNA mini kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according
to the manufacturer’s instructions. RNA was eluted in
60 μl of elution buffer and 8 μl used as template for real
time Reverse Transcription-Polymerase Chain Reaction
(rRT-PCR).
Real time RT-PCR
Two rRT-PCR protocols described by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, Georgia,
USA and Spackman et al., 2002 for influenza viruses, were
used to screen all the samples [16,17]. RNA was amplified
by rRT-PCR using the AgPath-ID One-Step RT-PCR Kit
(Ambion, Austin, Texas, USA) in a 25 μl reaction mixture
or Qiagen One Step RT-PCR Kit (Hilden, Germany). The
RT step conditions for all primer sets were 30 min at 50°C
and 15 min at 94°C. A two-step PCR cycling protocol was
used for the matrix gene primer set as follows: 45 cycles
of 94°C for 0 sec and 60°C for 30 sec and for the
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30 sec. All temperature transition rates were set at the
maximum transition rate of 20. Fluorescence data were
acquired at the end of each annealing step.
The rRT-PCR assays were performed on real time
PCR instruments (Applied Biosystems, Singapore) with
SDS software version 1.4 (Applied Biosystems, Singapore).
Results of the rRT-PCR assays were determined by the
analyses of cycle threshold values generated by SDS auto
analysis on samples against reference positive and negative
controls.
Data analysis
Demographic data was entered in an electronic database
file (Microsoft Excel, 2003). Basic analyses were performed
using Microsoft Excel to generate frequencies, graphs and
tables.
Ethical approval
Military to Military influenza surveillance is considered
a public health activity and is conducted with the Ghana
Armed Forces Health Directorate, Veterinary Services
Directorate and Ghana Health Service in a manner con-
sistent with Ghanaian standards. It has served to facili-
tate identification of potential sources of avian influenza
around military bases, through educational seminars,
and active and passive processing of bird samples. This
activity is under the Surveillance for influenza virus in
acute respiratory illness in Ghana project which was
initiated in 2007 under the integrated disease surveillance
and response system of the Ghana Health Service with
ethical clearance 015/06-07 from the Noguchi Memorial
Institute of Medical Research Institutional Review Board.
Results
Of the 1028 persons that attended the educational semi-
nars, 674 (56.4%) were males and 354 (43.6%) females.Table 1 Attendance of participants during troop education in
Region Garrison Barracks
Greater Accra 1 & 5 Teshie
Burma Camp
Michel Camp
Volta 7 66 artillery
Western 2 Myohaung Barracks (2BN)
Ashanti 4 Uadara (4BN)




TotalThe highest attendance of 200 (19.5%) was recorded in 3
Infantry Battalion, Sunyani, followed by Burma Camp
with 150 (14.6%) while Bawku recorded the least at 31
(3.0%) as shown in Table 1. The highest male (84.8%)
and female (52.3%) attendance were recorded in 66 artil-
lery in the Volta region and Michel Camp respectively.
In all the barracks with the exception of the barracks in
the Northern and Upper East regions, spouses and
dependents of troops attended the troop education pro-
gram. From the survey, 668 (65%) participants had heard
about avian influenza but did not know the difference
between avian influenza H5N1 and pandemic A H1N1
2009 influenza virus. One hundred and fifty-four (15%)
participants reported preparing sick and dead chicken
for food and 627 (61%) reported lack of knowledge in
signs and symptoms of avian influenza. Daily cleaning of
pens was commonly reported among the troops, how-
ever, basic hygiene practices like hand washing before
and after attending to poultry was rarely observed. Birds
with fowl pox lesions and respiratory abnormalities were
mixed with healthy birds.
A total of 828 samples made up of 579 tracheal, 248
cloacal and one feather thallus were sampled from 102
households (Table 2). The different bird species sampled
are shown in Figure 2. Every site and household had
more fowls (Gallus gallus domesticus) than the other
bird species 386 (56.7%). One hundred and twenty-five
(18.4%) ducks (Anas platyrhyncos domesticus) and 108
(15.9%) turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo) were sampled.
However, no ducks or turkeys were found in garrisons
three and five respectively. Some wild birds like the
common bulbul (Pycnonotus barbatus), parrot (Psittacus
erithacus), mallard (Anas platyrhyncos domesticus) and
black kite (Milvus migrans) were kept by individuals as
pets in 2BN in Takoradi. Of the 102 households
sampled, the highest numbers, 19 (19%) each, were from
7 garrison in Ho and 2BN in Takoradi while the lowestmilitary barracks
Attendance
Male % Female % Total
75 80.6 18 19.4 93
85 56.7 65 43.3 150
57 47.5 63 52.5 120
89 84.8 16 15.2 105
75 60.5 49 39.5 124
62 62 38 38 100
116 58 84 42 200
34 72.3 10 27.7 44
50 82 11 18 61
31 100 0 0 31
674 354 1028
Table 2 Regional bird population census and bird sampled in the military garrisons
Region Garrisons Barracks Bird population House-holds No. Birds sampled Sampling rate
Greater Accra 5 Burma Camp 1011 7 74 7%
Teshie 125 8 72 58%
1 Michel Camp 1174 5 53 5%
Shai Hills 120 6 29 24%
Asutuare 22 2 11 50%
Western 2 Myohaung 404 19 90 22%
Brong Ahafo 3 Sunyani 819 17 81 10%
Ashanti 4 Kumasi 68 7 38 56%
Northern 6 Tamale 1071 5 47 4%
Volta 7 66 artillery 498 19 137 28%
Upper East +Detachment Bawku/Bazua 498 7 48 10%
Total 5810 102 680 12%
+Troops from the Airborne in the 6BN, Tamale, stationed in Bawku and Bazua.
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all poultry were free ranging and mixing of poultry from
different households with wild birds was common. Fowl
pox lesions and respiratory abnormalities were observed
in 4% of the fowl.
None of the samples from the sick or healthy fowls
were positive for influenza A using the two real-time
RT-PCR protocols.
Discussion
Surveillance of avian influenza by Veterinary Services
Directorate (VSD) started in Ghana in 2006 with the
focus on commercial farms, live bird markets and back-
yard farms [18]. This was preceded by the pandemic pre-
paredness plan by the National Avian Influenza Working
Group (AIWG) in 2005 to detect and respond to threatsFigure 2 Various species of birds found in backyard poultry in militarof pandemic avian influenza. To date few studies aiming
at identifying the HPAI H5N1 in poultry have been con-
ducted after the 2007 pandemic avian influenza outbreak
in the country. We present a report on education and
avian influenza surveillance conducted in military barracks
across the country. The Military personnel and their
dependents fully participated in the seminars. Participants
were taken through the transmission, clinical signs and
symptoms, epidemiology, pathogenesis and public health
importance of AI and biosecurity. It was observed during
the seminars that dependent female spouses asked most of
the questions, which could be attributed to reservations of
uniformed personnel to ask questions in front of superiors,
or to the greater role of dependent spouses in care of
backyard poultry. One of the most frequently asked ques-
tions in the barracks was about the difference betweeny barracks, Ghana.
Figure 3 Number of birds sampled from households within the Military barracks.
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wanted to know whether vaccination against H1N1
protects against H5N1 and whether touching or eating
well-cooked infected birds was safe. These questions
necessitate the need for continuing education on avian
influenza and ways to recognize disease and prevent
spread for frequently rotating troops and their depen-
dents. Our findings showed that participants in all the
barracks have good awareness of pandemic influenza,
but detailed knowledge of some important facts was
less well known. The heightened awareness is expected
due to the recent 2009 pandemic H1N1 global outbreak
that led to mass education programs. This finding was
similar to what was seen in Italy [19]. However, in spite
of the high awareness and widespread knowledge of AI
and personal protection measures in the public, most
officers of the GAF and their families still practice
unsafe poultry handling. Direct contact with poultry
and poultry products was common among household
members of the military. Reporting of bird death to
veterinary officers was low and in some circumstances
people did not know where to report cases. Fifteen
percent of participants admitted they still prepare sick
and dead poultry for household consumption. These
findings provide evidence that awareness does not
necessarily lead to behaviour change. Behaviour change
involves comprehensive and multidisciplinary interven-
tion, which combines communication, feasible and
practical recommendations, including economic con-
siderations. In this context, improvement in risky prac-
tices can only be achieved through relentless behaviour
change efforts. While knowledge that disease can
spread from sick birds to humans is common, educa-
tion is needed on how to minimize risk of disease
spread amongst bird populations, and from birds tohumans, as well as understanding what to do with sick
birds. Our observations are similar to those by Vathsala
and Petticrew [20,21] that continuous education and
training is a process of updating knowledge, developing
skills, bringing about attitudinal changes, and improving
the knowledge and skills of troops who may be called
upon in a pandemic to perform their tasks efficiently and
effectively.
Some limitations of the study exist. The difference in
knowledge before and after a lecture was not examined,
nor was the decay of knowledge 3 months or 6 months
after participating in the training assessed. Selection of
households was also based on the availability and con-
sent of the owners. Where households owners were not
present and consent not given, the house was left out.
For each selected household, not more than 5 birds per
species were sampled from the same hen coop or farm.
During sampling, 680 birds from 11 different species
were sampled and tested for influenza A virus. Of these,
fowls were the majority and most common in every
household. All birds were physically well except for 14
fouls that were found sick with fowl pox and respiratory
abnormalities. None of the birds were found positive for
influenza A using two rRT-PCR protocols [16,17]. The
results obtained from the survey showed no evidence of
the presence of avian influenza virus (AIV) in the birds
sampled within the military barracks across the country.
The results are consistent with similar studies carried
out in commercial farms, backyard farms, live bird
markets and wild birds in the Tema metropolis from
May 2009 to September 2010 [14,15,22,23]. In spite of
high risk practices within the military camps, no positive
birds have been found and there have been no reports of
outbreaks. However, practices found among poultry
farmers in the barracks suggest outbreaks may rapidly
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hygiene like washing of hands before and after handling
poultry was found lacking in some barracks. In addition,
personal protection such as rubber gloves and nose
masks used to work safely with poultry on a daily basis
was virtually absent. Furthermore, farm management
practices, particularly fencing of farms and establishment
of foot baths should be implemented. The mingling of
wild birds with backyard poultry poses imminent danger
to naive poultry through interspecies transmission of
influenza and other pathogens.
The GAF is an important part of the biosecurity and
pandemic response for Ghana. Like many militaries, the
GAF is also susceptible to outbreaks of respiratory
disease such as influenza, endangering their ability to
provide stability in times of crisis. The actions and find-
ings described in this paper are important in several
respects. Firstly, education and awareness of avian influ-
enza among troops and their dependents were improved.
Secondly, public health leaders obtained a better under-
standing of the challenges and barriers by visiting all
garrisons and conducting seminars and sampling. Even
though no avian influenza was found to be circulating at
the time of the activities, poultry farming practices favor-
able to the spread of disease once introduced were iden-
tified. Future efforts should target better education and
equiping poultry farmers to prevent the spread of
disease among birds and between birds and humans.
Some interventions, like improved hand washing after
handling poultry and better reporting of sick birds to ap-
propriate authorities, can be improved primarily by edu-
cation. Others, such as improved facility designs and
provision of protective equipment will require more in-
vestment. Coordination between the GAF and the NIC
was strengthened by these exercises, and young military
veterinarians and public health workers gained experi-
ence. The authors hope that the insights gained into the
vulnerabilities and challenges facing the GAF, an integral
part of the Ghana healthcare and pandemic response
system, will better enhance future public health efforts
of the GAF and the larger national and global public
health communities.
Conclusion
Our results provide new insights on poultry handling
practices with regard to avian influenza by the GAF. Our
surveillance found no evidence of AI circulation in
poultry in military barracks during the study period.
Despite a high level of awareness, the troops and their
families were unaware of appropriate biosecurity mea-
sures to reduce risk of spread of disease within avian
populations or between birds and humans. Practices to
minimize the transmission and spread of disease are not
routinely followed and need to be strengthened. Thisshould include avoidance of direct contact with sick or
dead poultry, and use of protective equipment such as
gloves and masks when contact is unavoidable.
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